Abstract. Using a standard New Keynesian model, we show that moderate side effects of zero lower bound (ZLB) policy suffice for positive lower bound (PLB) policy to pay off in terms of welfare, especially when central banks fail to commit. For given side effects of the ZLB, as the shock that makes the ZLB bind becomes larger and more persistent, the dominance of PLB policy over ZLB policy becomes more likely. The findings hold for flexible and rigid economies with both fast and slow potential output growth and low and high inflation targets.
INTRODUCTION
When the zero lower bound (ZLB) became binding in every major economy after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008, these economies' performance turned out to be poorer than expected. Most economists link this disappointing performance either to factors beyond the reach of monetary policy or to central banks' reluctance to rigorously follow the prescriptions of the New Keynesian (NK) framework (see, e.g. Eggertsson and Krugman, 2012; Gali et al., 2012; Mian and Sufi, 2011; Stock and Watson, 2012; Summers, 2014 or Woodford, ) . To put it differently, according to these economists, monetary policy has not been sufficiently accommodative.
However, some other economists blame a monetary policy for being excessively accommodative by historical standards. For example, BIS (2014) claims that such a policy can promote forbearance lending, which keeps unproductive firms afloat, crowds viable firms out of credit, and thwarts capital and labour reallocation. The policy thus strengthens financial frictions and deters post-crisis restructuring. Note that even if only few non-viable firms received forbearance, a deep fall in interest payments could have quite similar effects to those of forbearance because it would allow non-viable firms to appear solvent and banks to delay loss recognition and balance sheet repair (cf. Arrowsmith et al., 2014) . Ci _ zkowicz and Rzo nca (2017) argue that delayed post-crisis adjustments maintain uncertainty about their timing, scope, and effects, while narrowing the possibilities for reducing uncertainty through information acquisition and processing, as information quality is low and there is a high risk that newly acquired information will soon become obsolete. Meltzer (2014) and Taylor (2014) , among others, contend that uncertainty can also be heightened by the unprecedented nature of monetary policy (and other kinds of policy), its unpredictability and failure to follow rules. In turn, heightened uncertainty invites economic agents to defer more serious adjustments.
It is hardly possible to unequivocally establish which of the two opposite views is correct. The paper addresses a much less ambitious problem: how strong (weak) the possible side effects of holding interest rates close to zero would have to be so that setting an effective lower bound at a higher level (and avoiding those effects) would pay off in terms of welfare. We approximate these side effects as an increase in inertia of a shock to the natural interest rate. We do not attempt to endogenize them in the NK framework, leaving this task for future research. Our only ambition here is to evaluate their minimum size, which would justify setting a positive lower bound (PLB) instead of the ZLB. However, while modelling them in a reduced form only, we justify such a shortcut by referring to the construction of natural interest rate and relating its determinants to main mechanisms of possible side effects of the ZLB discussed in the literature.
We base the evaluation in question on the approach developed by Jung et al. (2005) , which models the expiration of shock that makes the lower bound bind in a way that can be easily linked with various narratives on side effects of interest rates close to zero. However, to check the robustness of our findings, we also apply the approach by Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) and a piecewise linear perturbation solution method developed by Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015) .
The paper makes three main contributions to the literature. First, it studies the effects of the PLB. The possibility of a PLB instead of the ZLB has been observed in other studies on the ZLB. However, this topic has been analysed only, if at all, in the context of a 'lack of confidence' shock and self-fulfilling deflation (see, e.g. Benhabib et al., 2001 or Schmitt-Groh e and Uribe, 2010) . We analyse the 'fundamental' shock instead, which is used extensively in the literature on the ZLB. Second, the paper develops a simple analytical framework that makes it possible to compare benefits with the possible costs of an interest rate close to zero (or even below). Thus far, both of these effects have been analysed in complete isolation from each other.
Third, this paper puts into question an important piece of policy advice from the literature on the ZLB. Since Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) , the literature has unanimously advocated for aggressive interest rate cuts in response to severe negative shocks or the anticipation thereof. Our findings instead suggest that as a shock becomes more severe, the central bank should be more cautious about cutting interest rates to zero. The main reason for this caution is the risk of side effects from the ZLB policy, whereas older papers argued that the reason is to preserve dry powder for future emergencies.
The remainder of the paper is organized into four sections and an appendix. Section 2 describes the model used and its calibration. Section 3 provides the In Search of Appropriate Lower Bound main findings. Section 4 verifies their robustness. Section 5 concludes the paper. The appendix, including figures and tables, follows.
MODEL DESCRIPTION
We generalize the analytical framework developed by Jung et al. (2005) in two ways. Namely, we allow for PLB and trend inflation in the model. Most previous research on the lower bound for interest rates was based on the standard New Keynesian Phillips Curve, which we must modify accordingly, along with the algorithm for model solution.
The model
As in Jung et al. (2005) , the central bank faces the following minimization problem:
with the following one-period loss function L t :
where y t is the output gap at t. Equation (8) is based on the micro-founded household welfare criterion (see Appendix A4 for the respective derivation). Note that, in contrast to common practice, we add to the literature by completing the derivation under trend inflation; as a consequence, p t is no longer the inflation rate but a deviation of the inflation rate from the steady state. Policymakers are constrained by standard behavioural equations, i.e. the IS curve and the Phillips curve. The former is only slightly modified in a straightforward way to account for positive inflation in the steady state ( p):
where r is the parameter of households' relative risk aversion and i t and r t are, respectively, the nominal and the natural interest rate at t. 1 The Phillips curve under trend inflation has been proven by multiple authors to contain additional dynamic components in comparison to its counterpart under the zero steady state (see, e.g. Cogley and Sbordone, 2008) and reads:
whereby the reduced-form parameters in (4) are derived from structural parameters of the producer's profit maximization problem as in Cogley and Sbordone (2008) (see Appendix A1 for details). While the previous literature on the ZLB refers to reduced-form parameters of the Phillips curve only, we prefer to calibrate the structural parameters to ensure the consistency between (i) the producer's profit maximization problem leading to equation (4) above, derived 1. Since p t is the deviation of the inflation rate from the target ( p), the target itself has to be included in the IS curve.
under trend inflation and partly backward-looking pricesetters and (ii) the analogous problem in the previous literature derived under a zero steady state and purely forward-looking pricesetters (with parameters as summarized in Table 1 ). Minimizing (1) subject to constraints (3) and (4), after skipping the expectation operators (under perfect foresight, as in Jung et al., 2005) , implies a standard Lagrange function with / 1;t and / 2;t as Lagrange multipliers on IS and Phillips curves, respectively.
Note that in this setup, the central bank sets i t equal to p þ r t , and the loss function takes a value of zero as long as we ignore further constraints on i t . Next, any positive lower bound for interest rates requires a modification of KuhnTucker conditions related to the constraint i t ! PLB (instead of i t ! 0), which now take the form:
This form implies that, as in previous analyses of the ZLB, two states are possible: the lower bound is non-binding (which implies zero loss and a zero Lagrange multiplier on the IS curve) or binding (which leads to a positive loss, i.e. non-fulfilment of equation (3) and a positive Lagrange multiplier on the IS curve).
Shock definition
We begin in period 0 and assume that all variables take their steady-state values, i.e. the inflation rate is equal to p, y ¼ / 1 ¼ / 2 ¼ 0 and r t = r. The steady-state value of the natural interest rate can be estimated from the following equation, as in Jung et al. (2005) .
based on the discount factor, b, and the growth rate of potential output, y P tþ1 À y P t . In period 1, a shock of size e 1 occurs that brings r t down to a level that renders the lower bound binding (i 1 ¼ PLB and / 1;1 ¼ 0):
The shock is assumed to exhibit serial correlation of order 1 with inertia parameter q:
Literally interpreted, the shock means that suddenly everyone wants to save more. However, given that r t may also depend on variables other than the discount factor, more sophisticated interpretations are also possible, and indeed, they are used. In particular, there have been recent references to financial frictions (cf., e.g. Eggertsson, 2011) . We use this latter interpretation.
Further shocks are not considered, i.e. equation (11) is valid for t = 2,3,. . .; this dying out pattern implies that, for some t [ 1, the lower bound will cease to bind. Further analysis depends on whether the central bank can credibly commit to the optimum rule (5), subject to (6)-(8), or acts under discretion.
Approximation of possible side effects of ZLB policy
We approximate the possible side effects of ZLB policy as an increase in inertia parameter q.
The rationale is the following. There are three main types of these effects: (i) forbearance lending, which strengthens the financial frictions, (ii) delays in restructuring, which postpone recovery of potential output, and (iii) heightened uncertainty. While potential output growth appears in the equation of r t (see Eq. 9), financial frictions and uncertainty are not included in the versions of the NK framework commonly used in analyses of the ZLB. However, it has been shown elsewhere that NK models that incorporate them can be reduced to a form quite similar to the standard version (see, e.g. Christiano et al., 2011 and Barsky et al., 2014) . Thus, all main types of side effects of ZLB policy can inhibit return of r t after a shock to the steady state.
Technically, one may reach the approximation in question as follows. In period 1, a shock e 1 with inertia parameter q hits the economy and makes the ZLB bind. In period 2, the shock starts to expire. However, if side effects of the ZLB policy materialize, another shock e ZLB 2 occurs. This shock reflects financial frictions strengthened by forbearance lending, productivity growth muted by delays in restructuring or uncertainty heightened by these delays or unprecedented nature of ZLB policy. Its dynamics are difficult to specify. In particular, forbearance lending can be quite limited in the periods very close to period 1 and become widespread only later. The percentage of firms delaying restructuring can change according to forbearance lending prevalence. In turn, uncertainty, although largely related to delays in restructuring, can increase more rapidly because it depends not only on the intensity of its given source but also on its 'novelty'. Nevertheless, at some point, the shock e ZLB t has to expire if the steady state does not change. We calibrate this shock to keep a convenient constant inertia of the total shock to r t :
where.
Let us remind that to uniquely identify the sequence of shocks {e t ,e ZLB t }, we assume that for all t ≥ 3:
Note that such a calibration is consistent with the likely hump shape of the expiration of e ZLB 2 (we show some numerical examples of {e t ,e ZLB t }, while discussing main findings in the next section). It also implies that e ZLB 2 is weaker thane 1 , especially in the case of a large q. Under our baseline calibration of q, as specified in Table 1 ,e ZLB 2 must be more than five times as weak as e 1 at least. The baseline calibration of e 1 implies that e ZLB 2 should not exceed 0.66 of (quarterly) standard deviation of the shocks to the natural interest rate in the US, as identified by Billi (2006, 2007) . Specifically, it should be at most 0.01. Thus, it would be quite mild, especially in comparison with e 1 itself.
Solution under commitment
When the central bank credibly commits to the optimum policy rule from t onwards, the first-order conditions from the Lagrange problem (5) take the following form:
Note that the generalization to positive steady-state inflation, as in (4), implies the inclusion of second-order dynamics in the model. This inclusion also emerges in (17) as the second lag of the Lagrange multiplier / 2 .
The lower bound is binding from t ¼ 1 to t ¼ T. The last period when this constraint is binding can be found on the basis of / 1 , i.e. T is established so that / 1;T is positive but / 1;Tþ1 is not, according to conditions (6-8). In practice, a relatively high value of T is considered at the beginning, and it is iteratively decremented until the above-mentioned condition is met.
It should perhaps be mentioned that due to the presence of second-order dynamics and the resulting overshooting patterns, the algorithm must be slightly modified compared to, e.g. Jung et al. (2005) . It is insufficient to consider a distant T and decrement it until a positive value of / 1;T appears for the first time;
In Search of Appropriate Lower Bound instead, one needs to keep track of this condition coupled with another one, stating that for t = 1,. . .,T, / 1;t [ 0. Accordingly, the model solution consists of the following phases:
1. Equations (3), (4), (16) and (17) for t ¼ 1; . . .; T with i t ¼ PLB. (4), (16) and (17) 
Equations
3. Equations (4), (16) and (17) for t ¼ T þ 2; T þ 3; . . . with / 1;Tþ1 ¼ 0 and
In phases 2 and 3, i t is additionally derived from equation (3).
Solution under discretion
The first-order conditions do not read as (16) and (17) when the central bank cannot credibly commit to the same optimum policy rule in the future. In such a case, the timing to terminate the lower bound on interest rates is exogenous to the model (as in the special case of ZLB, cf. Jung et al., 2005) and can be determined by the following rule:
In (18), and per the analogy to the case of commitment, T is the last period of the lower bound binding, and T þ 1 is the first period after the constraint has ceased to bind. The solution for t ¼ T þ 1 and later is straightforward: the central bank sets
. . .; T, the model consists of equations (3) and (4), along with the constraint equation:
The model is completed by the terminal conditions on y and p:
Calibration
Our calibration strategy is to ensure that our model (and results) is comparable to Jung et al. (2005) based on the parameter set from Woodford (1999) , similar to the calibration made by Eggertson and Woodford (2003) . However, due to the changes in the structure of the model, this can be accomplished in a straightforward way only for a subset of parameters. Following Woodford (1999) derivation in Appendix A4 leads to the following welfare criterion, up to a scaling constant, terms of a higher order and independent of policy:
Equation (21) allows calibrating k on the basis of b, e, h, r, / and P.
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Regarding the parameters of the Phillips curve, it is sufficient for the abovementioned authors to calibrate only b ¼ 0:99 (i.e. the parameter on the one-period-ahead expected inflation rate) and j ¼ 0:024 (i.e. the parameter for the current output gap) under the assumption of zero steady-state inflation. This solution is not feasible with our altered structure of the model and four reducedform parameters in equation (4). Note that these parameters are interdependent and cannot vary freely, as they are based on the same subset of structural parameters.
All four parameters are based on b and r but also on (i) the Calvo probability h, (ii) the Cobb-Douglas exponent on labour in the production function 1 À a, (iii) the Frisch elasticity of labour supply u and (iv) the elasticity of substitution between goods varieties e. We calibrate a, u and e in line with the standards in the literature and, conditionally upon this, set h to match Woodford's (1999) j ¼ 0:024 in the standard Phillips curve.
In particular, we calibrate 1 À a, u and e based on the works of Wouters (2002, 2003) . The value of 1 À a ¼ 0:7 taken by the exponent on labour in the production function is widespread in the literature, resulting both from direct estimation attempts of the production function and from a direct calibration based on the labour share in national income. The value of Frisch elasticity of labour supply at u ¼ 0:25 seems to be relatively low, but the calibrations in the literature are quite scattered. For example, Christiano et al. (2005) assume a value of unity. However, in our case, such a change has only a marginal effect on the reduced form parameters in (10) and, hence, on our results. The calibration of e ¼ 3 in the New Keynesian monopolistic competition model is typically set to imply a mark-up of 50%. Additionally, even large changes in e (that we consider conducting the robustness check) have no significant effect on our results. Ultimately, the set of three structural parameters based on Wouters (2002, 2003 ) and Woodford's (1999) calibration of j ¼ 0:024 together imply the calibration of the Calvo parameter at h ¼ 0:7505.
The calibration of the shock size and persistence follows the previous literature on the ZLB with a serially correlated disturbance of the natural interest rate. We set q ¼ 0:8 as in Billi (2006, 2007) . This value is also the central point of the interval from 0.75 to 0.85 considered by Levin et al. (2010) . In our sensitivity analysis, we consider a wider range from 0.5 (the baseline value of Jung et al., 2005) to 0.9 (the maximum value considered by Billi, 2006, 2007) . The initial shock size,e 1 , is calibrated to 0:05, as in the case of Levin et al. (2010) . Note that this size is 3.3 of (quarterly) standard deviations of this type of shock, as identified by Billi (2006, 2007) .
3.
P ¼ 1 þ p is the gross inflation rate in the steady state. It appears in the equation defining parameter c (see Appendix A.4 for details).
In Search of Appropriate Lower Bound
We calibrate the steady-state natural interest rate in line with Eq. 9 at the level consistent with b, r and the growth rate of potential output equal to 0.02/4. The latter figure corresponds to the average growth rate of real GDP in the US economy according to Penn's World Tables 8.0 (since 1950) . As a result, r ¼ 0:0107. Steady-state inflation is set at p ¼ 0:02=4. The same value is proposed as the PLB. Note that these calibrations, as well as the previous ones, are expressed in quarterly terms, which corresponds to annual values of r at 4:28% and p and PLB at 2% . The 2% figure matches the inflation target most frequently seen in advanced economies, as well as the floor for the policy rate of the Bank of England since its foundation in 1694 until 2009 (and of most other central banks, too). Note that such a floor usually implied clearly positive real interest rates. When it was binding, it was often accompanied by a deep deflation. In our setting, the real interest rate at the PLB is lower (since steady-state inflation is positive, and if deflation occurs, it is short-lived and generally milder than in the past, especially over 19th century). It is quite similar to most other studies on the ZLB (where both steady-state inflation and the floor of interest rates are nil).
MAIN RESULTS
Two combinations of ZLB and PLB policy varying in terms of their credibility are considered: (a) both policies are discretionary; (b) both policies are pursued under commitment.
Of these two combinations, case (a) seems to be of much more practical meaning than case (b), which stems not only from the observed reluctance of central banks to commit, but also from the adverse effect of a severe negative shock on economic agents' trust in central banks that conditions their credibility (see, e.g. W€ alti, 2012). Credibility is crucially important to overcome the problem of the time inconsistency of such a commitment (see, e.g. Levine et al., 2008 or Woodford, ) . In addition, the commitment entails serious practical problems. For example, Eggertsson and Proulx (2015) prove that it would require from the central bank asset purchases of a completely infeasible scale. In turn, Swanson (2015) finds that any effects of forward guidance have thus far been surprisingly short-lived.
We begin the comparison of the ZLB and PLB policies as if the ZLB policy had no side (adverse) effects. It is not surprising that under this assumption, the ZLB policy is welfare enhancing relative to the PLB policy. That being said, the central bank's credibility is of crucial importance (see below). 4 In case (a), when both policies fail to prevent severe and long recession, the difference in the depth of the negative output gap and resulting deflation is large. In case (b), the 4. When the baseline model's calibration is applied, the micro-funded loss function amounts to 0.0096519 under the ZLB and to 0.027677 under the PLB if both policies are discretionary, as compared to 0.0012064 under the ZLB and 0.0019718 under the PLB if they are pursued under commitment. The difference in welfare is not directly interpretable (as measured up to a scaling constant), but is still useful for the predominant purpose of policy ranking. One could, in principle, transform it into the metrics of equivalent loss in consumption. We abstain from this, however, as the results transformed in such a way are usually benchmarked to the seminal results of Lucas (1987; see e.g. Schmitt-Groh e and Uribe, 2007) , which is not our intention here.
difference is less profound. Still, the ZLB policy makes it possible to clearly reduce the output gap in comparison with the PLB policy. Moreover, the subsequent overshooting and accompanying inflation needed to alleviate the recession are weaker and shorter lived than those under the PLB policy (see Figure 1) . Interestingly, the value of the lower bound (under the calibration considered) has no strong effect on the length of period during which the interest rate is held at the lower bound. In the case of ZLB policy, the period lasts 7 quarters under discretion and 8 quarters under commitment. In the case of PLB policy, it is longer by 1 quarter only.
Next, we relax the assumption of no side effects from the ZLB policy. In both analysed cases, the difference in q required for the PLB policy to pay off is quite moderate (Figure 2 ). Under the baseline calibration, it amounts to 0.063 in case (a) and 0.092 in case (b). Thus, the difference is lower when the central bank fails to commit (and welfare losses are large) than otherwise. Recall that case (a) is more likely combination of the ZLB and PLB policies than the case (b). Note that the dispersion in the baseline value of q considered in various papers on the topic (cf. Adam and Billi, 2006 and Jung et al., 2005 is three to five times as large as required in case (b) and (a), respectively.
Interest rate path
Output gap Inflation We also report baseline natural interest rate shock paths under discretion and commitment, along with the same shock paths computed under break-even q. The difference between the two paths, e t ZLB , is an order of magnitude smaller than the natural interest rate shock itself (Figure 3) .
The required difference in q also seems quite moderate compared to some empirics (Figure 4) . Namely, updated estimates of r t from Laubach and Williams (2003) point to a downward shift in the trend in r t after q4 2008, when the Fed funds rate was cut to near zero. The shift implies that r t was then hit by a shock, which, if not permanent, has been of such high persistency that currently, it does not seem to be dying out.
5 This interpretation seems to be shared by the Fed. Seven years after the outbreak of the global financial crisis, Yellen (2015, p. 12-13) acknowledged that r t 'is at present well below its historical average', 'is anticipated to rise only gradually over time' and 'may not, in fact, recover as much or as quickly as 5. There is no trend and hence no shift in trend in the estimates of r t derived by Barsky et al.
from a DSGE model. However, those estimates confirm that r t was hit by a large negative shock of a very persistent nature around q4 2008. Since then, the estimates from Barsky et al. (2014) and the updated estimates from Laubach and Williams (2003) remain stubbornly near zero and are quite close to each other, which was rarely the case previously.
Interestingly, as a shock becomes more persistent or larger, the required difference in q lowers and thereby the implied difference in the half-life of e 1 (see Table 2 ) becomes more limited, in relative terms. This relationship casts doubt on aggressive interest rate cuts to zero in response to a severe negative shock, which, since Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) , have been unanimously advocated by the whole body of literature on the ZLB that envisages a 'fundamental' shock. The results instead suggest that as a shock becomes more severe, the central bank's response should be more cautious, especially when it is reluctant to commit or its credibility is dubious. Note that the reason for the suggested caution is not the need to preserve dry powder for future emergencies, as older papers have argued; it is the risk of the side effects of ZLB policy.
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
We check for the sensitivity of our results to the assertion that certain costs related to rapid restructuring can be avoided or reduced if restructuring is slow. We approximate these costs by an increase in the initial shock magnitude (e 1 ) under the PLB policy, as compared to the ZLB policy. We verify how large the implied e 1 would have to be under PLB policy to push the break-even q out of the range considered in the literature on the ZLB and keep the welfare unchanged as compared to ZLB policy. It follows from the baseline calibration that the implied e 1 would have to exceed several times (quarterly) the standard deviations of the shock under consideration, as identified by Billi (2006, 2007) to make the cost of PLB at least match the potential benefit. The Figure 3 Natural interest rate shock paths under baseline q = 0.8 and break-even q respectively, and the difference between the two paths (e ZLB t ). Source: Authors. Note: This figure reports baseline natural interest rate shock paths (i.e. under baseline q = 0.8 and e 1 = À0.05) under discretion (a) and commitment (b), along with the same shock paths computed under break-even q (0.737 for discretion and 0.708 for commitment; left-hand scale). In each case, the difference between the two paths, e ZLB t , is depicted as the grey, hump-shaped surface (right-hand scale)
In Search of Appropriate Lower Bound respective ratio amounts to 6.8 (growth by 82% as compared to baselinee 1 ) in case (a) and 4.8 in case (b) (increase by 29%; see Figure 5 ).
We check the robustness of our findings to changes in the model's calibration (see Table 3 ). It follows that potential output growth has almost no impact on the required difference in q. In the range considered for potential output growth, this difference increases (to a very limited extent) mainly when potential output growth is high (3% or above). Thus, if the ZLB policy entails side effects, it should be avoided by countries with both fast and slow economic growth.
The value of p has a more significant but still limited impact on the required difference in q. The difference increases when the inflation target is set higher, but the increase is very weak. This weakness should be expected due to the findings on PLB, as setting a PLB is functionally quite close in the NK model to a downward revision of p (both setting a PLB and lowering p increase real interest rate, when lower bound starts binding). The result implies that countries with both high and low inflation targets should be discouraged from the use of ZLB policy by its possible side effects.
As far as parameters related to the elasticity of economy are concerned, u has almost no influence on the required difference in q. Even a significant increase in u leads to a limited rise in the required difference in q. The case of e is not (2003) In Search of Appropriate Lower Bound significantly different. Its impact on the required difference in q is primarily related to changes in k and is mild (at least as long as it does not fall below 1, i.e. it remains consistent with empirical studies on mark-ups). 6 The required difference in q very weakly increases with a rising e (except for a very high value of e when the required difference decreases) under discretion. Under commitment, the relationship is opposite and stronger, albeit still very weak. It strengthens the conclusions drawn under the baseline calibration, if it does anything. The breakeven q remains within the range considered in the literature on the ZLB even for extremely low e (and as a result very high k). With regard to h, it has almost no impact on the required difference in q under discretion. A certain effect, however weak, appears under commitment. The required difference in q decreases somewhat with a rising h. However, this decrease is irrelevant. The break-even q remains within the range considered in the literature on the topic for any value of h. Overall, countries with both flexible-and rigid-price economies should be discouraged from using the ZLB policy due to its possible side effects. Any differences in results for these economies are small. However, if one wants to be more specific, more valid reasons for avoiding the ZLB policy are displayed by 
(a) (b)
SD SD Figure 5 Increase in shock magnitude ensuring welfare equivalence between baseline ZLB and PLB with lower persistence (q = 0.5). Source: Authors. Note: This figure reports combinations of e 1 and q which produce equal values of the loss function for PLB = 0.02/4 (calculated for a given combination of e 1 and q), equivalent to the ZLB scenario under baseline calibration (e 1 = À0.05 and q = 0.8). The given combinations equalize possible costs of faster restructuring due to PLB policy (as compared to ZLB case) with possible gains stemming from faster shock absorbtion (faster return of natural interest rate to its steady state level). The costs are expressed in terms of initial shock to natural interest rate and are shown as the difference between baseline e 1 = À0.05 (solid line) and e 1 value for a given q (horizontal dotted line). Two combinations of ZLB and PLB policies are considered: (a) ZLB and PLB under discretion; (b) ZLB and PLB under commitment. For comparison, the figure also shows standard deviation of the shocks to the natural interest rate in the US, as identified by Billi (2006, 2007) 6. Recall that k depends on e. We consider a wider range of e than justified by the results of empirical studies on mark-ups to cover values of k that appear in the literature on the ZLB. countries with a more rigid labour supply (lower u) and a higher degree of nominal rigidities (lower h).
We also check how a simultaneous change of all parameters to the level implying the largest required difference in q, as indicated in Table 3 , would affect our findings. It follows that under discretion the break-even q remains within the range considered in the literature on the ZLB (see Figure 6 ).
In case of commitment, there is no break-even q under the assumed calibration because the fast y P tþ1 À y P t and high p raise the nominal interest rate in the steady state high above the established lower bound. As a result, below a certain value of q (0.69 in the calibration considered), the loss function under PLB assumes a constant value regardless of q (while remaining larger than under the ZLB) because at such a value of q, the lower bound binds for only one period (two periods for a value of 0.70). For all q, at which the lower bound binds for only one period, the output gap and inflation follow the same path, which results in the same loss function values (irrespective of q). To put it differently, if central bank is unable to set interest rate so as to keep inflation at the target and output at its potential level for one period only, then q is irrelevant for welfare losses under the lower bound. The construction of the model requires at least Þ is assumed at 4%, trend inflation ( l) at 4%, Frisch elasticity of labour supply (φ) at 5, elasticity of substitution between goods varieties (e) at 10, Calvo probability (h) at 0,9. In the case (b) y P tþ1 À y P T is assumed at 4%, l at 4%, φ at 5, e at 1,1, h at 0,4. Parameter values are selected so as to get a highly reduced value of break-even q.
two periods of lower bound binding for the relevance of q for welfare losses under the lower bound.
As the next robustness check we allow for the credibility of central banks to depend on the value of lower bound. One cannot prejudge which type of policy, ZLB or PLB, is more likely to be credible. On the one hand, the ZLB policy signals a dovish bias. By contrast, PLB can be considered a sign of hawkish bias, limiting the actual probability that the central bank will allow inflation to exceed the target. On the other hand, the empirical evidence, albeit very scarce, suggests that the ZLB policy can undermine trust in the central bank (Albinowski et al., 2014) . At the same time, as the PLB increases, the more weight households will probably place on the central bank cutting rates below the announced PLB when large negative shocks hit the economy. Thus, we scrutinize two possible combinations: (c) PLB policy is pursued under commitment, while ZLB is discretionary; (d) PLB policy is discretionary, whereas ZLB is pursued under commitment.
In case (c), the PLB policy outperforms the ZLB policy in terms of welfare, even if the ZLB policy has no side effects. Although the latter implies lower average nominal interest rates, the former results in a milder and shorter recession (see Figure 7 ). This result suggests that when the economy is hit by a severe In Search of Appropriate Lower Bound shock, the commitment, if credible, counts more for the welfare performance than the exact value of the effective lower bound does (as long as this value is reasonably low). It is true that the weight of the central bank's credibility is already highlighted in many other studies on the ZLB (see, e.g. Billi, 2006 or Eggertsson and . However, while these studies prove that credibility provides central banks with the ability to stabilize the economy when the ZLB binds, the exercise suggests going a step further. It follows that the credibility can deprive central banks of a strong justification for aggressive interest rate cuts all the way to zero. In contrast, in case (d), both the lower bound value and an inability to commit work to the detriment of the PLB policy. Thus, the PLB policy generates much larger welfare losses than the ZLB policy does, if the ZLB has no side effects. Only in this case, would the required difference in q have to be large for the PLB policy to outperform the ZLB policy in terms of welfare. The break-even q under the PLB policy (0.425) is out of the range considered in the literature on the ZLB (see Figure 8 ). This result occurs because PLB policy implies higher interest rates compared to the ZLB policy, not only until the lower bound binds but for some time later as well. This case again highlights the significance of the central bank's credibility. Should the interest rate cut to zero condition this credibility, the central bank would not have to attach much weight to the possible side effects of the ZLB policy. We also conduct a sensitivity analysis on how changes in effective lower bounds compared affect the main results. While we considered 0 and 2%, one can imagine other values equally well justified. For example, Bank of England The lowest value of lower bound covered by the grey area equals 0% (ZLB), while the highest value amounts to 2%, i.e. the baseline PLB considered in the paper. The lowest value of q covered by the grey area represents the lowest value of this coefficient considered in the literature on the ZLB, while the highest value equals the baseline calibration in the paper. Two types of interest rates' policies are considered: panel (a) refers to policies under discretion, while panel (b) refers to policies under commitment and Bank of Canada treated 0.5% as their effective lower bound during the Great Recession. However, the latter bank raised its policy rate to 1% in 2011 and kept it at this level until 2018. The Reserve Bank of Australia did not lower its policy rate below 3% until 2013. In contrast, some central banks, inclusive of the European Central Bank and Bank of Japan, have adopted negative interest rate policies in spite of widespread scepticism about the desirability of these policies (see, e.g. Hannoun, 2015) . We draw contour lines of equivalent loss under different values of shock inertia and lower bound (see Figure 9 ). It follows that under both discretion and commitment, a PLB, even higher than 2%, may pay off relative to significantly lower interest rates, even negative ones, if these lower interest rates imply only moderately larger inertia of shock (remaining within the range of q considered in the literature on the ZLB). This conclusion holds especially when central banks fail to commit. In this case, even a PLB above 4% may outperforms a negative lower bound (NLB) below minus 2% in terms of welfare, if the shock inertia is at the lower end of the range in question under the PLB policy, and at the upper end under the NLB policy.
Our sensitivity checks are also related to the shock definition and, consequently, the relevant model solution method. In addition to the solution under perfect foresight (see Subsections 2.2-2.5), we consider the shock of uniform strength over time that is withdrawn at some random point in the future, as in Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) (Figure 10 ). It follows that our main findings are fairly robust to such a change in the definition of a shock that makes the ZLB bind. We also consider a path of shocks rather than a single shock that makes ZLB bind (using the solution method by Guerrieri and Iacoviello, 2015) ( Figure Figure 11) . This change does not alter any of the main conclusions either. Actually, the shock persistence would have to decline even less to ensure the same welfare under PLB, as in the case of q ¼ 0:8 and ZLB, under both discretion and commitment. PLB binds more often when the same path of shocks is considered; however, in a stochastic setup, the long-binding shocks are less likely, and hence, the welfare equivalence between PLB and ZLB policy is easier to achieve.
In summary, the findings provide support for cautiousness with regard to cutting interest rates to zero (or below). Central bank has strong reasons for such deep cuts only if they are a condition for its credibility. Note that PLB would by no means rule out quantitative easing to avoid a possible panic in systemically important segments of the financial sector after the outburst of the financial crisis. Quantitative easing under PLB policy would be in line with Bagehot's (1892) prescription of lending freely to solvent banks against good collateral and at penalty rates.
CONCLUSIONS
If the ZLB policy has no (adverse) side effects, such as strengthened post-crisis financial frictions, delayed restructuring or heightened uncertainty, it is welfareenhancing relative to the PLB policy. However, quite moderate side effects of the ZLB policy (moderate particularly in comparison to some post-Great Recession empirics) are enough for the PLB policy to pay off in terms of welfare. This situation holds especially when central banks fail to commit, and even if restructuring, fostered by the PLB policy, entails some costs that could be reduced or even avoided through slow restructuring. Moreover, as a shock becomes larger and more persistent, the side effects required for PLB policy dominance over ZLB policy in terms of welfare become more moderate. A robustness check suggests that the findings hold for economies with both fast and slow potential output growth, with a low and higher inflation target, and with more and less flexible markets. If anything, they are more robust for economies with slow potential output growth, a low inflation target, and strong rigidities. ZLB policy could be welfare enhancing in spite of even large side effects only if it helped the central bank to credibly commit and the PLB policy undermined the central bank's credibility. Otherwise, PLB policy should pay off, even if central bank could lower interest rates below zero, provided that NLB policy is associated with some side effects which PLB policy allows to avoid. Our findings indicate that a quantitative evaluation of ZLB (and NLB) policy effects on post-crisis financial frictions, restructuring and uncertainty should be given high priority in the research agenda. This paper takes the first step toward accommodating both the positive effects and side effects of the ZLB policy (or extremely accommodative policy in general). However, further steps should establish the optimal central bank response to severe shocks. The paper suggests that aggressive interest rate cuts to zero may not be the correct response. Central banks should perhaps establish a PLB instead and use quantitative easing to avoid panic in systemically important segments of the financial sector. Apparently, Bagehot (1892) should not be forgotten. 
